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Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) showed that, in the presence of preexisting
distorting taxes, the optimal pollution tax typically lies below social marginal damages.
The authors view this result as a refutation of the so-called "double dividend hypothesis,"
which suggests that a tax on pollution can both improve the environment and reduce
distortions in the tax system.  Their paper spawned a large literature on optimal
environmental tax rates in a second-best world.
In this note, I argue that the emphasis on tax rates is misguided.  Using an
analytical general equilibrium model, I show that for reasonable parameter values, an
increase in tax distortions (arising from an increase in required tax revenues) leads to a
fall  in the optimal Pigouvian tax  while environmental quality improves. In general,
knowledge of the direction of changes in optimal environmental tax rates due to changes
in the economy is not sufficient for understanding the impact on environmental quality.
JEL No:  H21, H23, Q28
I appreciate comments from A. Lans Bovenberg and Don Fullerton on an earlier
version of this note.  I am also grateful for support from a National Science Foundation
grant (SBR-9811324) through the National Bureau of Economic Research.1
I. Introduction
The double dividend hypothesis suggests that a tax on pollution can both improve
the environment and reduce distortions in the tax system.  In an important article,
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) reframed the hypothesis as a question of whether the
optimal tax on pollution in a second best world is higher or lower than the social marginal
damages of pollution.  In that paper, they "demonstrate that, in the presence of
preexisting distorting taxes, the optimal pollution tax typically lies below the Pigovian
tax, which fully internalizes the marginal social damage from pollution" (p. 1085).
I argue in this note that the focus on tax rates is misguided.
1  A more important
issue is the relation between the level of tax distortions in the economy and
environmental quality.  Moreover, knowing that the optimal pollution tax falls below
social marginal damages does not imply that environmental quality falls in the presence
of preexisting tax distortions.  In effect, we should distinguish between "price" questions
and "quantity" questions.  The price question refers to tax rates while the quantity
question refers to environmental quality.  Framed this way, this note evokes Atkinson and
Stern (1974) and their analysis of public good provision in a second best world.  That
paper first shows how the Samuelson Condition for pure public goods is affected by the
presence of distortionary taxes (a "price" question).  It then shows how the optimal
provision of the pure public good is affected by distorting taxes (a "quantity" question).
A key message in that paper is that answering the question of how the Samuelson
Condition changes tells us nothing about the optimal provision of the public good.  This
                                               
1   The emphasis on tax rates can also be found in a number of papers that followed Bovenberg and de
Mooij, including Fullerton (1997), Schob (1997), and Jaeger (1999).2
note gives a similar message in the environmental policy arena (hence the sub-title of the
note).
Specifically, I show that the optimal environmental tax component of a
commodity tax on a polluting good falls short of social marginal damages and that the
environmental tax component falls as revenue needs (and hence tax distortions) rise.
These "price" results might lead one to believe that environmental quality should fall as
revenue needs rise.  (One might also draw this conclusion from Bovenberg and de Mooij
when they note that "high costs of public funds crowd out not only ordinary public
consumption, but also the collective good of the environment" (p. 1088).)   This turns out
to be incorrect.  I show that the response of environmental quality to an increase in
revenue requirements depends on two effects: a substitution effect  as consumers
substitute from clean to dirty goods as the environmental tax component falls and an
output effect  as consumers substitute from purchased commodities to leisure (a clean
good).  For all reasonable parameter values, I find that the output effect dominates the
substitution effect so that an increase in required revenues improves the environment
while simultaneously reducing the optimal Pigouvian tax increment.
II. The Model
Following Bovenberg and de Mooij, I employ a linear production technology in
which labor (L) is used to produce a clean good (C), a dirty good (D), and government
services (G).   Government services can be either clean or dirty and I assume that the
fraction of services that contribute to pollution is constant and equal to g.  The economy
has N identical people and labor productivity equals h.  Since each good is produced
using one unit of labor, the technology is
(1) NhL = NC + ND + G.3
Utility is a function of the two goods and government services as well as leisure (V) and
environmental quality (E):
(2) U = u(C, D, V; G, E)
where environmental quality is a function of the aggregate production of the dirty good
plus gG: E = e(ND+gG), with e' <0.  Individuals maximize utility subject to a time
constraint (V+L=1) and a budget constraint:
(3) hL = (1+tC)C + (1+tD)D
where tC is a tax on C and tD, a tax on D.  The social marginal damage of pollution in








As in Fullerton (1997), I first solve for optimal tax rates conditional on some level
of required government services (G).  I totally differentiate the utility function, plug in
the first order conditions from the household's utility maximization problem and the
resource constraint (dL = dC + dD) and obtain a measure (in income) of the welfare gain
from increasing tD while the tax rate on C is reduced to keep total tax revenues constant:
(5) dU/l = tCdC + (tD - t)dD
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Perturbing the tax rates will generate changes in all the variables in a general equilibrium.
Thus, we need a complete model in order to determine the changes in C and D to obtain a
closed form solution for the relation between t*C and t*D in equation (6).
                                               
2   This is equation (9) in Fullerton (1997).4
First consider the consumer response to changes in prices.  Following the
approach taken by the previous authors, I assume a subutility function for C and D that is
homothetic and weakly separable from leisure.  Let this function be Q(C,D).  With this
assumption, I can characterize the preference for C and D in terms of the elasticity of
substitution in consumption (s):
(7) ) t ˆ t ˆ ( D ˆ C ˆ









= .  In other words, t ˆ is the
change in tax as a percentage of the consumer price.  The consumer price for C (pC)
equals 1+tC and  C C p ˆ t ˆ =  (similarly for pD).  Labor is taken to be the numeraire with a
fixed gross wage of h and a real wage of w=h/pQ, where pQ is a price index on the
consumption bundle Q(C,D).    Labor supply is related to the real wage by the
uncompensated labor supply elasticity (e):
(8) w ˆ L ˆ e = .
The percentage change in the real wage depends on the change in tax rates:
 (9) D C t ˆ ) 1 ( t ˆ w ˆ f - - f - =
where f is the share of consumer spending on the clean good.
Next, we turn to the government's budget constraint.  Fixed government spending
(G) is financed by taxes on the N identical households in the economy:
(10) tCC + tDD = G/N
Differentiating (10) and keeping the level of G fixed, we obtain
(11) , 0 ) D ˆ t ˆ )( 1 ( ) C ˆ t ˆ ( D D C C = q + f - + q + f5
where q is the tax expressed as a fraction of the consumer price (e.g. qC = tC/(1+tC)).  The
final equation follows from differentiating the overall resource constraint (1) and defining
production shares pC = C/hL and pD = D/hL:
(12) D ˆ C ˆ L ˆ
D C p + p = .
Equations (7) - (12) are five equations from which we can solve for    C t ˆ   and   , w ˆ , L ˆ , D ˆ , C ˆ  as
functions of  . t ˆ
D
Some straightforward algebra leads to the general equilibrium response of C and
D to a change in the tax on the dirty good:
(13) D
C D D C C C
D C D t ˆ
)) t t ( ) t 1 ( p ( D ) t 1 ( C p
D ) D p C p )( t 1 (
dC
- s + e - + e -
+ e - s
=
(14) D
C D D C C C
D C C t ˆ
)) t t ( ) t 1 ( p ( D ) t 1 ( C p
D ) D p C p )( t 1 (
dD
- s + e - + e -
+ e - s
- =
Substituting (13) and (14) into (6) yields a simple expression for the relationship between
the optimal tax rates on C and D:
3







Before turning to the two questions posed in the introduction, it is worth examining
equation (15) and noting the following.  First, if environmental tax revenues are sufficient
to cover government expenses, then a tax on the clean good is unnecessary.  In this case,
the tax on D (as well as the difference, tD-tC) exactly equals t.  This is the Pigouvian rule
in a first-best situation.  Even if a tax on C is required, the first best rule still holds so
long as e equals zero.  Second, if neither of these conditions hold, then the Pigouvian tax
                                               
3 Equation (15) and the government budget constraint will pin down both tax rates.  We are only concerned





D t t -  falls short of t.
4,5  This confirms Bovenberg and de Mooij's result but
avoids any possible confusion that might arise from implicit taxation of the dirty good
through a tax on labor.  Third, we can recharacterize (15) in terms of the partial-
equilibrium marginal cost of public funds for a labor tax (ø) as defined by Goulder and























when a tax on labor is used.  The model in this paper does not employ a tax on labor but
rather taxes on the two commodities.  We can renormalize the system so that C is the
untaxed good and labor supply is taxed by dividing the consumer budget constraint by














Substituting this relation into (16) yields ø = (1-etC)









D t t .
The Pigouvian tax increment equals social marginal damages divided by the partial
equilibrium marginal cost of public funds.
6
                                               
4   I presume throughout that 1-etC lies between zero and 1.
5   Equation (15) can be related to the optimal tax on a polluting good in the presence of a labor tax.
Fullerton, Hong, and Metcalf (1999) show in their equation (23) that if tC is set to zero and a tax on L used




















1 t , where tL is the labor tax.  With no tax on the clean good, tD is the
Pigouvian tax increment and tL/(1-tL) is simply the labor tax re-expressed as a uniform commodity tax.  In
other words, equation (23) in Fullerton, Hong, and Metcalf is essentially the same as equation (15) here.
6   See Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) for an equivalent derivation in the case where a tax on labor
and the dirty good are employed.7
III. Analysis
Imagine that the government needs to raise additional distortionary tax revenues
to finance an expansion of government services.  A natural question to ask is what




D t t - ) and social
marginal damages (t), a "price" question, as noted in the introduction.
7  An early reading
of the Double Dividend literature might suggest that this increment should rise as revenue
needs rise.
8  As we shall see, this supposition is incorrect.  That the Pigouvian tax
increment falls suggests that the increase in required government revenues will lead to a
dirtier environment (a "quantity" question), a concern presumably of greater interest to
environmentalists than tax rates, per se.  On the contrary  as I'll show below, the increase
in required revenues should lead to a cleaner environment.
Let me now turn to this policy experiment and these two questions.
9  Specifically,
I investigate how an increase in required distortionary taxes to finance an increase in G




D t t - ) and 2) environmental quality (E).  The
diversion of resources from the private to the public sector directly affects the
environment to the extent that the fraction of dirty public services relative to total
government purchases differs from the fraction of dirty private goods relative to total
                                               
7 I treat G as an exogenous parameter while the tax rates are set in an optimal fashion.  In other words,
some political process leads to a choice of G and conditional on that choice, tax authorities set tax rates to
minimize deadweight loss.
8   For example consider this quotation from Repetto and others (1992): "Taxes on these environmentally
damaging activities [resource waste, pollution, and congestion] would not distort economic decisions, but
rather would correct existing distortions" (page 2).   Following this logic, the greater the distortion, the
higher the tax rates on polluting activities.
9   In a recent paper, Gaube (1998) considers a slightly different experiment.  He compares environmental
quality in a first-best relative to a second-best optimum and finds that environmental quality is higher in the
second-best optimum.  To obtain this result, he restricts utility to be quasi-linear in private consumption,
leisure,  the government good, and the environment.  This restriction is stronger than the restrictions on
preferences in this model.  Moreover, his model does not address the question of the impact of increased
tax distortions on environmental quality.8
private goods (D/(C+D)).  For example, if g equals zero, the expansion of government
services will likely lead to a cleaner environment since the government output has no
impact on the environment.  To avoid this demand side effect, I  assume that government
spends its revenue on the same mix of clean and dirty goods as does the private
economy.
10  In other words, dirty government output is a fraction of G equal to






Environmental quality will increase if ND + gG decreases or equivalently if
(18) 0 G ˆ D ˆ ) 1 ( G G < p + p -
where pG = G/NhL and pC + pD + pG = 1.
For the purposes of measuring the general equilibrium effects of an increase in G,
equations (7), (8), and (10) continue to hold.  Equation (11) now becomes
(11') . G ˆ ) D ˆ t ˆ )( 1 ( ) C ˆ t ˆ ( G D D C C p = q + f - + q + f
Equation (12) becomes
(12') G ˆ D ˆ C ˆ L ˆ
G D C p + p + p = .
Finally, conditional on G, equation (15) relating the optimal taxes on the clean and dirty
goods continues to hold.  Differentiating this equation yields
(19) . t ˆ
t 1
t 1













These six equations can be solved for changes in C, D, L, tC, tD, and w as functions of G ˆ .
Let me first consider the question of the impact of an increase in G on the
Pigouvian tax increment.  From equation (15) we see that
                                               
10   This is the approach taken in Harberger (1962) to rule out demand side effects in his classic analysis of9
(20) d(tD-tC) = -etdtC
and the Pigouvian tax increment will fall if the tax rate on C rises as G increases.
Rewrite (15) as  t
*
D = t + (1-et)t
*
C  and note that the sign of  dtD  equals the sign of  dtC
if  et - 1 >0.  With a high range estimate of  e  equal to 0.5, this inequality will be positive
so long as t < 2, or that the social marginal damages of pollution do not exceed twice the
production cost of the dirty good.  I'll assume that this condition holds.
11  If we rule out
any Laffer tax effects, then sgn(dtD) = sgn(dtC) = sgn(dG) > 0.  With dtC > 0, equation
(20) indicates that the Pigouvian tax increment falls as G rises (so long as e > 0).  An
increase in required distortionary tax revenues does not favor increased taxation of the
dirty good relative to the clean good.
The intuition underlying this result is quite simple.  Sandmo (1975) showed that
the optimal tax on a polluting good is a weighted average of a Ramsey component and
marginal environmental damages.  As government revenue needs increase (and so the
marginal cost of public funds increases), the weight on the Ramsey component rises and
the weight on the environmental component falls.  With separability between leisure and
consumption goods, the optimal Ramsey components on the two goods are equal.  Thus
an increase in the Ramsey weight leads to a decrease in the difference between the two
tax rates (i.e. the Pigouvian tax increment).
Having answered the "price" question, I now turn to the "quantity" question.
Recall that environmental quality rises if  0 G ˆ D ˆ ) 1 ( G G < p + p -  (equation (18)).   Some
simple manipulation of the six equations in our system shows that
(21) . L ˆ ) t ˆ t ˆ ( G ˆ D ˆ ) 1 ( D C C G G + - s p = p + p -
                                                                                                                                           
the incidence of the corporate income tax.  I thank Don Fullerton for suggesting this approach.10
Thus,  . 0 L ˆ ) t ˆ t ˆ ( 0 dE D C C < + - s p ￿ >   The first term on the right hand side of (21) is
positive since the Pigouvian tax increment falls,
12 and the second term is negative since
labor supply falls in response to the lower real wage.  The first term is a substitution
effect.  As the Pigouvian tax increment falls, consumers will substitute from C to D.  The
strength of this effect depends on the elasticity of substitution in consumption (s).  The
substitution effect will work towards reducing environmental quality.  The second term is
an output effect and reflects the fact that the increase in taxation will lead to a substitution
away from both produced goods towards leisure.  Since leisure is a clean commodity, this
effect serves to improve environmental quality.  Whether an increase in government
spending financed by increased taxes leads to a fall or rise in environmental quality
depends on the relative size of the substitution and output effects.
13
To get a feel for the relative importance of the substitution and output effects,
consider the following numerical example.  Assume an economy with the following
characteristics.
14
                                                                                                                                           
11   This condition also ensures that tD > t (see Schob (1997) for an argument that this will hold).
12  C C
D
C
D t ˆ t ˆ
t 1
t 1








et - = where S < 1 since tD > tC and 1-et < 1.  Thus
. 0 t ˆ ) 1 ( t ˆ t ˆ
C C D < - W = -
13   Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) carry out a similar exercise and derive an equation similar to
equation (21).   See Table 4 in that paper.  The advantage of this derivation is that 1) it abstracts from any
demand side effects, 2) the formula is considerably more transparent, and 3) I can easily provide some
numerical results to show the relative magnitude of the two effects (see below).










With these parameter values, the optimal tax rates are t
*
C = 0.27, t
*
D = 0.55, and the
Pigouvian tax increment is 0.28 < t.  Now consider a 10 percent increase in required
government revenue.  The substitution effect then equals 0.005 and the output effect
equals -0.015, so the total effect is -0.010.  In other words, the 1.5 percent fall in labor
supply will more than offset the substitution effect, and pollution falls by 1 percent.
Table 2 presents a range of estimates of the impact of a 10 percent increase in required
revenue on pollution, for differing values of s and e:
Table 2. Impact of Increased Revenue Requirement on Environment
e e
0.15 0.30 0.45
0.5 -0.005 -0.012 -0.021
1.0 -0.003 -0.010 -0.018 s s
2.0 0.000 -0.006 -0.013
Only in the case of an elasticity of substitution equal to 2 combined with a low labor
supply elasticity (0.15) does the increased revenue requirement fail to reduce pollution.
In all other cases, pollution falls between .3 and 2.1 percent.
IV.  Conclusion
This note has accomplished two goals.  First, it has confirmed in a simple model
that the optimal incremental tax on pollution lies below social marginal damages with
pre-existing distorting taxes and that the optimal environmental tax increment falls as12
government revenue needs rise.  Second, I have shown that an increase in government
revenue needs has two offsetting impacts on the environmental quality.  For all
reasonable parameter values, environmental quality improves despite the decrease in the
Pigouvian tax increment.
This result evokes Atkinson and Stern's analysis of public good provision in a
second best world.  The first part of their paper focused on how the Samuelson Condition
for pure public goods is altered in the presence of distortionary taxation.  That question is
analogous to the current focus on the relationship between the environmental tax
increment (tD-tC) and social marginal damages (t).  Atkinson and Stern then pointed out
that answering the question of how the Samuelson Condition changes (a price question)
tells us nothing about the optimal provision of the public good (a quantity question).
Similarly here.  Learning that the optimal tax increment falls increasingly short of social
marginal damages as the need for distortionary taxes rises does not imply that
environmental quality must fall as revenue needs increase.  On the contrary, a quite
plausible result is a cleaner environment.  In short, the focus on tax rates is misleading
and attention should be paid to how pollution itself is altered by changes in the need for
distorting taxes.13
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